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Housing renewal in Hungary: from socialist non-renovatíon through individual market actions to area-based public intervention lván Tbsics lntroduction For over 40 years, housing policy in Hungary ignored housing;
:enewal. Socialist policy concentrated on new housing development :nd the existing stock was neglectecl until the late 1980s when the :1rst renewal attenlpts took effect. The transition to capitalism was ::rarked by the large-scale privatisation of housing, following which the :enovation of nrulti-family housing lvas depenclent on decision making :.rrnes between owners in each condominium. Following a decade of ::on-policy'in housing, new financial initiatives were introduced at ::e national levei fiom the early 2000s directed towarcls the energy .iicient renewal of condominiums, nrainly in large housing estates. Thrs chapter has five sections. Following iln opening review r: the history of frustrated urban renerval efforts in Budapest, the :r'iond section surnmarises the condrtions underpinning the renewal : residential areas in Hungary during the socialist period and the ::.rnsition to capitalism. The thircl section anaiyses housing policy .:proaches to renerval in post-socialist Hungary and the fourth focuses :r the development of a municipal area-based renewal strategy in -irdapest, an exciting story about the battle between nrarket factors .::J public policy efforts. The final section draws conclusions and ,-nsiders the prospects for the future.
As the largest ciry in Hungary and with unique experience of urban .--J housing renewal dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, Rudapest -:cr-ides the case study for the chapter. Following mass privatisation, and '. .:}r problems arising from a complex two-tier loca] goverÍiment system, --.: municipaliry developed an area-based urban renewal framework at the end of the 1990s. After years of limitecl success, a new period began in2O07 when European tJnion (EU) funding began to be available for the renovation of multi-family houslng in relatively poor areas. As a resuJt, new integrated and aiea-based urban renewal progranrÍnes were developed, in which the renovation of housing became one of the most important elements. The emerging financía1 crisis' conrbined with a decrease in EU funding due to changes in the eligibfity ofBudapest, and new 1ocal governfi1eÍrt regu1ation have, however, created an uncertain future for area-based urban and housing renewal.
In this chapter a distinction is made bet\'veen housing renewal and urban renewal: the latter refers to area-based and concentrated efforts to achieve the renovation of all buildings in a given area. In Budapest, the large scale of renewal problerns has necessitated going beyond building-by-building renern'al to achieve a more spatially concentrated approach.
Background Hungary a country of 10 mi1lion peop1e ín central Europe has existed within its present borders since 1920. After the Second World War, Hungary fell into the sphere of Soviet influence, and in 1948 a oneparty political system and planned socialist economy were established. After initial market-oriented reforms in the 1980s' the country becarne a capitalist multi-party democracy in 1"990.
Hungary, Budapest and the strange career of multi-family residentÍal buildings 'Witlr over 2 million people in 1980 and !,7 million at the present time'
Budapest is the only metropolitan ciry in the country. It is more than eight tines larger than the next category of citíes which have in the region of 200,000 inhabitants. As a result, the díscrrssion crf Hungarian urban and housing renewal is lirrúted to the case of Budapest.
Older residential buildings have hac{ an unusual 'career'in central and eastern European cities. Many existíng inner ciry buildings were constructed in the second half of the nineteenth century when private rental housing was dominant. Private landlords were planning to invest in comprehensive renovation when the First World'W'ar was declared. This was accompanied by rent control which was not conducive to investing in renewal. Housing markets began to become 'free'again ín the late 1930s, and landlords began to plan for renovation, but then the Second W'or1d'W'ar broke out.
*,
Housing renewa! in Hungary At the end of the 1940s, ;úthough most inner ciry buildings were already 50 to 60 years o1d, much-needed renovation was postponed again, this time due to the nationalisation of multi-family houses.
Landlords lost ownership of buildings and at besr, rerainecl a rented flat íor their own use. The rrcw landlord was the socialist state, whose prioriry was certainly not the renovation of inner city housing. Housing had quite a iow prioriry overa11, and only the corrsrruction of nerv housing estates, at the periphery of cities, received political attention.
As a result of many decacles withour rnilor r-enewal, tire inner ciry housing stock cleteriorated steadily, The idea of the concentrared renewal of older districts ditl not emerge unril rhe late 1970s; and the 1980s, the last decade of socialism, saw rhe first smal1-scale prlot projects. The model of socialist urban renewal applied rvas based exclusively on public financing, but this quickly collapsecl both fi nancially ancl politically.
Changing times: different models af area-based renewal in Budapest There have been many attenlpts to renovate the densely built muiti* tamily housing stock in Buclapest ancl several models can be identified:
. In the inter-w'ar period, the housing system was based on private renting and the private landlord haci the decision making power regarding renovation. Residents could not influence this decision and the roie of local government \\,as very iimired. The important actors in this process were the Íinancial irrstitutions provic1ing loans for renovation r,vith the cost directly influencing rent levels.
. Foilowing nationalisation in the socialist periotl from i 94B to 1989, the loca1 council and public mainrenance company \,vere the decision makers in principle, although in pracrice, decisions concerning housing priorities and their funding were taken at the central political ievel. Residents could influence this only indirectiy, for example, by lobbying local governnient for rhe rener,val of their building. Financial considerations were replacecl by bureaucratic and political decisions about budget resources and the cost ofrenovation did not influence rent levels.
. After mass privatisation in the early 1990s, the new cotldoirúnitrnrs became the main actors ir1 the process and residents'influence on decisions about renovation was maximised. At this tinre, however, there were few subsidies available and the roie and interest of financial institutions weÍe very limited. Therefore, the cost of renewal inurrediately increased the cost of housing.
. From the late 1990s, a new model of municipalities 'steering'urban renewal was gradually developed in Budapest. Both the nrunicipal (city levei) and some of the cityt 23 district 1ocal governrnents initiated area-based renewal in cooperation with condominiums.
Through this process, the more pubiic and social aspects were taken into account, the costlier the projects were for the public sector.
A sumrnary of these models in Table 8 .1 shows that they differ significant\ in many ways including: the key decision-makers; the extent to which residents could infi.uence decisions; whether the costs of renovation were transferred to housing costs; the kind of loans and The courtyard shows how carefully the work was undertaken, even the smallest details were renovated, such as the'hat-hanger'visible between the door and the window on the first floor. P/,ofoi lVán Tosics irr tlre pubiic rental sectclr', all the tenants oí the state-owned' rundown tenenrents were re-housed elsewirere. Fa'rilies livi'g in adjacent h.using due for renewal were allocated to two thirds of the flats while the remainder were used to rervard higher status grollps according to their high political or economic posirions.
Market-oriented policy changes in the transition period: largesca Ie h o u si n g p rivati sati o n After 1990, the privatisation of public housing was accelerated with parliament passing a larv in 1993 to rnake it compulsory where tenants wanted to buy their homes. As a consequence of this 'right to buy'poiicy and within a clecade, the share oípublicly owned flats decreased from ov-er 60 per cent to below 10 per cent ofBudapest! housing stock. By iarv, privatised residential buildings had to be turned into condominiums. Decisions about the building required a simple majority for 'everyday matters', while 100 per cent of votes were needed lor larger issues such as comprehensive renerval. Residents in large, multi-family houses \ /ere usualiy very mixed, with a substantiai share of poorer families who could rrot afford the costs of renewal. As a resu.lt, area-based schernes became difircult, if not impossible, to achieve. With the iarge-scale privatisation of public housing, central governnent stepped away from housing and urban renewal, and decisíons about renovatiotl became a matter for condominium residents, influencecl to a linrited extent by central and local government subsidy schemes.
In the countries of centr:al and eastern Europe, the transicion of ihe housing stock to capitalism took very ditferent pathways. The approach in the former East Germany was the rnost effective, the lrivafisation of flats was very rare as practicaily no sale discounts rvere civen, while housirrg associations were rurned into etficient actors in :he housing market. At the other extreme was the most inefiicient :nodel, adopted by Romania, Bulgaria and A.lbania, where almost the lrrtire housirrg stock was privatísed without the legal or or54anisational --ornrs necessary to ensure joint actions at the building level. In these ,-ountries, the lack of condonriniurn or cooperative structures has 1ed :o 'patchwork renovation'by individuai households. The Hungarian --rse can be considered in-between these two extremes.
Housing potícy aPproaches to renewaI in post-socialist Hungary
The 1990s can be considered the 'non*policy'period for housing.
With privatisatíon, responsibility for housirrg was shifted fl'onr centra1 to loca1 government, and at any point in the ndd-i990s, housing matters were split befr'veen slx diÍl_erent rninistries. In tlris context, housing rene$'al had a very low priority and only a few-eiernents of housing policy continued to appll', principally legal regulation and financial schemes.
In legal regulation, an important novelty was the connection of the 7924 Law on Condominiutrs (originally introduced for newly built multi-family housing) to the process of privatisation. For muitifamrly privatised buildings to be able to function. it was rrecessary t<r provide a lega1 franreu'ork to create a condorrúnium association, elect a condominium manager, hoid ureetings at least once a year, ancl decicle the morrtlíy condominiurrr fee. It soon became c1ear that the requirement for unanimous decisions on iarger issues such as building renewal made them almost irrrpossil-lle to achieve. The rnoc1ification oí the Law on Condominiums in 2004 rnade decision making processes more e$ective such that: major decisions, for exarnple. the sale of common properties and larger improvements becarne possible with 80 per cent qualified majoriry votes of residents;
Íinancial discipline was raise<l with a sirnplífication of the regulation on the debts of residents mor'e than six months in arrears;
. the collection of information on orvnership and debts became compulsory.
From the late 1990s, banks becanle more active in issuing housing loans and after the 2004 Condominium Law rnoclification, access to loans became rnuch easier. The 2000s also brought changes irr the financial conditions enabling the renovation of condoruinium buildings. In the absence of any generai sr-rbsidy system for housing renewal, the introdr.rction of financial incentives for the energy-eÍ1icient rerrovation oírnulti-fánrily buildings on larp;e housing estates was a cautious step forward. The initial interest rate subsiclies were replaced with the much nrore eíÍicierrt Panel Plus programme in 2005.
Support to home owners for ener5ry-saving improvements was offered in the folior.ving form:
local govetnments could establish a framework (bidding system) for condominium renerval and could apply to the relevant ministry to contribute to the financirrg of tire successful bids;
the costs of energy-saving renor,'ation were shared equally between the national government, the local governurent through nonrepayable subsidies, and the conclominiutn. The I/3-1/3-1/3 systenl irraxirrrisec{ tlre atrrount of state contribution at € 1,600 per flat' tlrough in r'eality tlre average was € 1,000 per flat; since 2005, rnodifications to iarger conrlorrriniums of more than 10 flats coulcl attract ioatrs to pay íor tlre hone owner's one third share lvithout the requiremeut that each flat owner takes a loan individualiy-.
The improved conclitions for public sr"rbsidy resulted in a speeding up of the renovation of preÍabricatecl (system*bui1t) buildings on large housing estates. In the town of Miskolc, for exarnple, the owners of 2'5 per cent of all preíabricated {lats handed in successful bids in The renewal of prefabricated housing on large-scale housing :states has been a relative success story, but as will be seen in the next ,:ction, this is less lhe case for the spatially concentrated renewal of -r1d buiidings.
Re newi ng Eurape's ho usi ng The case of Budapest: gradual policy development towards area-based urban renewal While individual building renewal has been supported by national policy, area-based renewal was developed locally, with the longest history in Budapest. In the turbulent first half of the 1990s, state owned public housing was first transferred to iocal governments and in Budapest to the 23 districts. The municipaliry retained only sorne 'strategic'roles, including rent setting, but by the early 1990s, the municipality gave up any attempts to maintain conlmon regulation.2 As a result, the differentiation oípublic rental housing between districts becarne very wide. In the better offareas of the ciry for example in the inner city, the public rental stock was sold quickly, whjle in the poorer areas, for example in L)istrict VIII, a substantial stock of the most dilapidatecl buildings remained in public ownership. The municipaliry of Rudapest could not afi-ect this situation but was entitled to collect half the privatisation revenues to establish a city-wide urban renewal po1ícy.
Different conditions and models of urban renewal in the Budapest dÍstricts
Until the late 1990s, the municipality played practically no role in urban renewal. Housing-related decisions were taken at the district 1eve1 and their relative power clecreased r,vith the advance of privatisation. Three types of situations developed in different districts as shown in Table 8 .2.
The rypical positions can be described as follorvs:
. Typ" A areas: the better-off areas of the city with high land arrd property values including the central business district, green belt and garden city areas. In such areas, privatisation is virtually complete and the dominance of better-oÍ{fami1ies ensures the firrancial basis for the renovation of privatised inclividual buildings. Typ. D areas: the run-down areas at the edge of the inner city and in the transitional belt. Residents living in these areas have less money and are less eager to buy their flats which are in largely dilapiclated buildings.
Thus, rnass privatisation has led to a differentiation in the likelihood of renewal across tlre city which is deterníned by a combination of property values and the social composition of resiclents.
An exampie of Type A is Belváros in Central Business District V' where the renovation oí individua'l buildings ís typical and rnost contlorniniums have been renewed since privatisation. High real estate values encouraged residents to take an interest in renewal rvhile poorer people who could not cope with increased conclominium fees cou1c1 easily sell their flats to middle-class fanrilies. At the sarne tinre, the rvealthy district council was able to offer non*repayable subsidies for condonrinium renovation. ln other areas, the likelihood of renovation was very low, ancl even the B0 per cent majoriry decision possible since 2004 r,vas difficult to achieve in socially mixecl areas. This explains the large number of unimproved buildings across Budapest except in the best areas ofthe citv. There were in Budapest two exceptions to the above ciassification ri hich deserve mention, one area-baseci renewal action avoiding rrivatisation as explained in Case Study 2, and another was based on -arge-scale demolition.
CASE STUDY 2
District lX, Middle Ferencváros, regeneration organised by the public sector with substantial private sector investment -\t the beginning of the 1990s and just before the Right to Buy policy lad been passed in Parliamertt, the local government of District IX :pproved a renewal plan for the whole central area of the district --onsisting of approximately 10,500 flats. Consequently, the lUght to Buv díd not app1y in the area pl'anned for renewal and the buildings remained in local government ownership. In this exceptional situation, the district local government as public landlord launched an overarching urban renewal policy (see for exanple, Locsrnandi, undated).
This was the largest and most successful urban renewal project in Budapest in the course of which the whole central part of Ferencváros was partly renovated using public resources, part was denrolished and new housing was built by private investors. This success story was due to the wisdom of 1ocal politicíans who realised and accepted that renovation should precede privatisation and not the other way round.
The initíally very lo'nv status of tire area increased significantly and rnostly middle*class families moved in. The flats in the renovated buildings were offered for sale to their tenants after the completion of the renovation. The poorest stratunl of the oríginal residents, including most of the Roma Íbrnilies, was nroved out of the area into replacement flats enabling a slight improvement in their housing situation. Tfus was effectively 'gentrif ing regeneration'as many of the original residents have been replaced by higher status families.
The results can be seen in Figure 8 .3. Today this is the largest renovated area in the historic part of the city, although Figure 8 .4 also belongs to this story. It shows a rundown building in the peripheral part of the same district to which the poorest, nuinly Roma, part of the original population has been sent, Thus this version of post- The other exception to the mociels shown in Table 8 .2 involved 1arge*scale denrolition in l)istrict VIII Józse&áros, Corvin-pronrenade area. This was a very low status area with dilapidated housing. The over-w.helming rnajority of the housing srock remained in local soverninent orvnership as its poor residents had neither the financial :neans nor the will to buy the run*clown buildings. Finaiiy the local soverl)lnent decided to undertake the large-scale rebuilding of the :rea, all of the original residents were moved, either accepting a :eplacement flat or financial compensation. The vacant and cleared ,lte was sold to a private developer rvho built ofiice, commercial and :esidential buildings for sa1e. As a result of this marker-based and ,:rongly gentrifying model of renewal, the totally rebuilt area will recone a middle-class neighbourhood.
'he Budapest concept of urban renewal in the late 1990s .--. already mentíoned, the natiorral regulation of housing privatisation i:ecified an equal split of sale revenues between the districts and the 173 páoto: lván Tosics nrunicipaliry with the stipulation that Budapesr municipaiiry had ro spend its share on the renewal of residential buildings. Although not all districts complied with this regulation, sales revenues started to accumulate and an initial step was taken in 1994 when the municipality introduced a subsidy system for the renovation of 1oca1 governnent owned residential buildings. As the proportion of owner*occupied housing increased to over 90 per cenr as a result of the 1993 Right to Buy policy, however, this new systenr. appiied to only a sma11 part of the housing stock. As a resuh, it was considered important to develop an overarching policy for area-based urban renewal which included privately owned buí1dings.
In 1997, the Municipality ofBudapest approved the Budapest (Jrban Renewal Progranrme (BURP) and a new policy ancl financing system was introduced in 1998. Two main forms of renewal were supported: area-based renewal and the renerval of individual condominiums. The total anlolrnt of subsidies approved between 1996 and 2001 was 10.5 billion Hungarian Forint (HUF), or approximately € 45 rrríllion, 62 per cent of which was spent on area-based district municipal programmes aithough the condominium proeramme steadily took on greater significance, so that by 2001 it represented 55 per cent of all funding' Fígure 8'5 sunrnrarises BURP expenditure over the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . and by sub-programme, for condominiums and district r nu nicipal progranunes. The distribution of planned area*based BURP schemes is shou'n in Figure 8 .6. As can be seen, all the schemes are on the poorer Pest side of the city, to the east of the River l)anube. In reiliry more than half the moiley spent on area-based progranlnles rvas allocated to can be seen in the a11ocation of the subsidies for the renewal oí condominiums. Figure 8 '7 illustrates the donúnance oíDistrict V, the nrost affluent centra1 business district oíBudapest which, as its condominiutn owners were in the best position to pay their share of renewal, absorbed almost ha1íof all non-repayab1e grants.
An inclependent evaluation of BURP (MRI, 2002) identified the conflict berween the housing intentions and social consequences of the prograÍnme. In the absence of any Spatial or social targeting' programme subsidies went to the best organised district and condominiums in the most aÍfluent areas. This a11ocation of renewal subsidies enhanced existing spatial inequalities in the city.
The critical analysís of the BURP concluded with the íollowing recomrnendations:
. preserve the two tier distribution systeÍn of BURP funds (municipality and district loca1 governments) ; . develop a nornrative subsidy systenr distinguishing three different n'pes of renerr,al pro€ ]ramnles; rrrarket-based renewal; social1y sensitive urban renewal ancl renewal to preser:ve the urban heritage;
. establish a Municipal (Jrban Renewal Unit; . contirlue monitoring; urban renewal programnres.
The evaluation led to an important change in the emphasis of the Budapest Urban Renewal Prog;ranrme, extending it with a new anp;le oí socially sensitive urban renewal.
The emergence of a new public policywith social orientation in the mid-ZOOOs
The BURP evaiuation identified three types of ur-ban renewal, which dift-ered as follows in terms of airns, approach, tools, organisational structures and the roles of different levels of governrnent:
. Market-based renetual: in high lancl value areas with a hornogeneous middle-class population, renewal cou1cl be financed by the population with private investors eager to invest. Exarnples of this kind of rener.val were mainly located in the Central Business District, for exanrple, Fashion Street. Tlre Centr:rl Ferencváros fype of large ulüan renewal schenre couid be partly classified irrto this fype as private investors played a nrajor part, although the public sector had the decisive role in preparing areas for renewal.
. Sacially sct'tsitiue renewal: in the most dilapidated areas of the ciry the requirement for public sector guiclance and finance was expected to be greater as the residents, who airnecl to stay in the area, had no means for, while investors had no interest in, investing in renerval. of which was to improve the rnost deteriorated areas with and for their residents. It was suggested that reÍlewal efforts should not be targeted exclusiveiy at irnprorring the physical fabric but that equal lveight should be given to social, health, educational and other 'soft' aspects. Attempting to firanaple the social problenrs of incr:easingly segregated low-incorne areas required a more conrplex approach in rvhich the municipal government had to play an important ro1e, while more effecfive org;anisational structures had to be developed to achieve integration ancl coordination.
As a result, in 2005 the Budapest municipality amended its law on urban renewal to incorporate social renewal arid, basecl on expert recommendations, assigned three pilot areas to receive the first interventions. One of the essential characteristics of the new social approach to urban renewal was the iarger role playecl by the municipal government. This happened only partly in the case of the most successful social rener,val project, the Magdolna quarter scheure, as after the desippation oíthis area and some inrtiai Íinancial support fronr the municipaliry leadership went over ro the district. District VIII then estab1ished the 'Rév 8'iocal deveiopmeÍ]t conlpany' owned and largely financed by the district, wirh nrinoriry shares owned by the rnunicipaliry.a A multi-disciplinary team was esrablished which worked on physical, social, economic and other aspects of the renerval.
CASE 3
Magdolna quarter: the pilot case for'socially sensitive urban renewal' The Magdolna quarter of approximately 12,000 people is one of the 11 quarters of District VIII. Due to its location adjacent to rhe railway station, this was ahvays the poorest part of the city attracting people arriving from the Great Plain' a depressed agricultural regíon covering much of easte{n Hungary. In Magdolna, only 6 per cent of people have a universiry degree, 12 per cent are unemployed and 42 per cent of the housing (Figures 8.8 and 8 .9) consists of public rental flars, ;ompared with a Budapest averaple of iess than 5 per cent. Roma, a rnulti-layered ethnic group which can include nr-iddle-c1ass musicians, rnake up 30 per cent of the population, approximately four times higher than the average in Budapest (estimates by the local housing inanagement company).
The Magdolna progranrme was initiall;l Íinanced from very rnrited public funding provided by the rnunicipal and district 1ocal governments. It started with five nrain policy 'pillars': A prograrume -for creating communitícs: irrvolving the creation of a communiry house located on the central square in a refurbished emply íactory and including extensive conrnruniqv development pr-ojects. An educatíottat pragramme: tlre totally segregated elementary school, attended only by Roma chídren' was nrer'6;ed with a non_segregated secondary school, and in this way', turned into a mixed school where Roma chídren had the opportuniry to complete 12 years of education.
A safety prograffiffiei a detailed social and crime prevention programÍle was combined with a progralnme to change the attitude of the local police.
A special prograffime for publíc tenants: treating publicly owned rental buildings as quasi-condominiums in which limited renewal rvas unclertaken for tenants who offered the largest in-kincl contributions.
A nelv phase of the Magdolna programlne began in 2008 when EU --o-financing became possible and larger renovation works could be :arried out (Figure 8.10 ). This phase focused on the public rental :uildings but also offerecl support to private condominiums in the area. ipproxinrately € B rnilliorr of EU Structural Funds enabled the renerval ,.i many buildings, including sonie ;100 flats in rhe area. Pedestrian .:eas and communify sports yards were created, accompanied by :ublic safery programmes; a training ancl enrploymeÍlt prograÍnn1e;
.::d strenghening the local social and education services.
)resent problems and future prospects for urban and housing '?newal in Budapest :-. the principal financial support for BURP was Budapestt share of . r'ursing privatisation revenues, it was clear that this programme could -, :: last for ever. By the second half of the 2000s, such privatisation _:-''eriLl€ S decLirred substantially and the municipality was unable to "::lace thern with contributions from the limited municipal budget.
-:us, soon after the introduction of social renelval, the most costly -:-prosrarrune, it became clear that BI-RP was in danger of financiai -apse. Fortunately Hungary joined the European lJnion at the best There are other factors, however, which point to a bleak future for urban and housing renewal in Budapest. The first is the decrease in municipal revenues as fewer and fewer buildings are privatised by the districts. As a conseqtlence' the ar'ea-based dinrension oí the renewal programme has been almost entirely abandoned and only iimited subsidies are available for írnproving condonriniurns. Tlre second factor arose from a change in the Law on Local Governrnents adopted at the end of 201 1 . This law favours district locai governments and ends the -rnrited opportunities for the more strategic municipal influence over rhe public rental sector and the renewal of residential areas in Budapest.
The third change limits the only rerrraining source of renewal iinancing, Eu Sttuctr-rral Funds. Besides a probabie decrease in the EU budget fiorn 2014, the financial position of the Central Hungarian Region, of which Budapest is part, is set to worsen.('Sorne EIJ money ''r'il1 continue to arrive and the energy-efilicient renewal of buildings :rright continue at a lower ievel, but Budapest's share will decrease :adically. This drying out of EU money wi1llead, in the absence of :nv other putiic resources, to the end of social urban renewai.
The result of all these factors is likely to be, frorn 2014, a total --ollapse in the financing of area-based progrummes. As a combined :fect of the financial crisis, anti-Budapest polítics and decrease of EU .:nding, ur-ban renewal will again depend on decisions in relation to ::dividual buildings without any area-based policy background.
Summary and outlook _,_isitors to Budapest enjoy the ar'chitecttrral urriry of the cíty but ---:ickly recognise the substantial renewal backlog. The renovation :: residential buildings was corrstantly postponed in the twentieth r.:rflrr!, either due to the effect ofwars or the primacy of the shortage ,: housing. The first attempts at the area-based renewal of older areas '--:ergecl in the last decade of socialisrn but were limited by the low '-::ancial capacity of the state. After the collapse of socialism, large-sca1e -.,.using privatisation followed and housing lost prioriry.
In the Hungarian regulation of housing privatisation, pr:ivatised :.:lti-fanúly buildings had to be turned into condonriniums and the introduction of the 80 per cent benchmark for decisions on renovatiotr ensured the rninirnum conditions for Lruilding renovation. After a decade of 'no policy' in the 1990s, thel need íor pubLic intervention emerged again, but the development of such policies was slow. Irr ternrs of the financing of horrsing renewal, rrational pro€ ]ralrules were introduced on1y for the enerw eí1icient renovaliotr of prefabricated t'uildings on lurge housing estate's.
Budapest, witb the remains of the public rental stock often in very poor condition and a dorninant stock of market sector corrdclnriníums, had to develop its own po1icy íor the renewal of buildirrgs, both public and private. After the mass privatisation of public rental housing and the decentralisation of public adrninistration to the districts, the possibilities for the overarching anci spatially concentrated renerval of residential areas vanished.
By the end of the 1990s, the municipalitv had launched an urban renewal programrne based on its share of privatisation revenues, srrpporting condorrriniunrs and areas ín neecl of urban renewal. Both sub_programnes íunctioned througlr bidding procedures, favouring those condominiunrs ancl neíghbourhoods r'vlích had clear programmes for renewal and which could raise their ornn financial share. An independent evaluation of the prograrnme established that the condorninium sub-prosrarnme largely subsidised the renovation of multi-farnily builc1ings in the aÍfluetrt intrer ciry while the area-based sub-progranrme contributed to the reeieveiopnterrt of one area wíth poor housing but the best 1oc:rl policy ancl organisational capaciw.
The critícal evaluation of the prograrrrme led to the launch of a new and efrective sub-prograrrr-rne to ac}rieve urüan renerval with a social ertrphasis, concentrating on the most deterioi'ated areas of the city, This required large-scale pubiic investment where the renewal challenge was the greatest and tire ability of the residents and the willingness of investors were the lorvest. Recently, a successful programrne of social urüan renewai has been developed, nraking use of EU finance in the integrated improvement of one of the poorest areas of Budapest.
(Jnfortunately all these promrsing efforts can be expected to conle to an end by the núd-2010s, dr're to tlre Írn;rncia1 crisis of the nrunicipaliry the sharp decrease of EU funds and the further decentralisation of 1ocalgovernment. There seerns Litt1e possibi1ity of tlre public Íinancing of area-based renewal in the ne;rr future. The condomrnium-based model will become the exclusive way of renewal requiring the right pre-conclitions of a hrgh value location; a sma1l propertyi and strong mr.rtual representation and agreenent alnong the co-owners of the building. As a consequence, renerval of the olel housing stock will a Housing renewal in Hungary ['re further differentiatecl accorcling to land and properry values in parallel with a socio-spatial segregation of population. The end of the coorclinated renewal of cleprived areas will lead to further segregation ancl deprivation.
The case of Budapest slrows the difiiculties oí (re-)gaining public influerrce over housing ancl urban renerval after the mass privatisation of rnulti-{bnrily housing and tire extreme decentralisation of public administration. \Vith huge effor:t, nern"'moclels r,vere developed which depended heavily on public financing and cooperation between the different levels of local Eiovernrnent. Recent developments suggest the end of area-based social urban renewal in Budapest for the foreseeable íutrrre. The long awaited third model of urban renewal' focusin5; on heritage areas, did not even start and its chances are very low in the context of dinrinishing public financing opportunities. Housing renovations will continue in the future on a building-by-building basis. This, however, wíll leacl to increasing differentiation between the better-off and the poorer parts of the ciry. Besides, over-arching renewal of the heritage areas is very unlike1y, except for cherry-picking some parts of these by the private investors.
To overcorne these unfavourable conditions will be very difiicult.
Changes are ueedecl in iegal regulation enhancing once again the role of the municipal, ciry-wide, ievel in relation to the districts. The social .rtrd the heritage models of lrotrsing anc1 utüan renewal should be reintrocluced, based on substantial support frorn the public sector. These changes, howeveq are unlikeiy in the short term.
Notes
Hr,rngary did not use fully the allowed anount of CO2 emissions and could 'ell the excess quota to countries which had rnore enrissions than aliowed.
It u'as therefore the first country which sold CO2 quota on the Ettropean :trarket to Belgitrm arrd Spairr' The revenue of approxirrrately € 100 nrilliorl ''i'as planned to be used for tlre energy eÍl]cierrt renovation of prefabricated :uildings.
: This kind of exaggerated subsidiarity lras 1ed to extfeÍl1e conseqLlences' ...'ith the rent levels in the best districts being lower than in the worst. In the -rrmer, few rental units rernain and the clistrict leadership is less concerned .iout the revenue fronr thenr. In the poorer districts, every small atrount of ::lcorne counts and thus rents are constantly itrcreased.
TheJewish quarter is a well known heritage arerr with many old buildings in ::re inner city of Pest. In the late 1990s, the district loca1 goverrunent started : -. relocate families and transfer the dilapidated burldings to developers whose Renewíng Europe's housi ng aim was, instead of renewal, demolition and the construction ofmuch larger new buildings which did not fit at all with the character of the area. As a result of growing public protests, the rebuilding of the area was finally stopped by the heritage authority in the late 2000s. Since then, nothing has happened and the deterioration of the area continues. This case is a clear illustration of the ptoblems created in high land value heritage areas when the public regulation and support system for heritage renewal is missing. Region will be classified as objective 2, due to the high GDP per capíta level of Budapest which means a much lower level of EU financing than before.
